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Estimating the Effects of U.S. Distortions in the Ethanol Market Using a 
Partial Equilibrium Trade Model 
Ariadna Martinez-Gonzalez, Ian Sheldon, and Stanley Thompson 
 
In this paper we assess the impact of the elimination of trade distortions on imports from Brazil to the U.S. 
For this purpose, we estimate a partial equilibrium trade model – an ethanol export supply function for 
Brazil and an ethanol import demand function for the U.S.-, based on annual data from 1975 to 2006, and 
use the results to compute a “back-of-the-envelope” measure of the deadweight loss derived from those 
trade distortions as well as one derived from producing the 35 billion gallons proposed in the “Twenty in 
Ten” 2007 State of the Union Policy Initiative assuming the distortions are not eliminated. Two-stage least 
squares is used to estimate both functions, the world price of ethanol being treated as endogenous. This 
paper supports the idea that the U.S. and Brazil would reap gains from trade if trade distortions were 
eliminated. 
 
Since the oil crisis of the 1970s, countries around the world, specifically those highly 
dependent on the movement of oil prices, have begun a quest for alternative sources of 
energy. Biofuels are one of the main sources; specifically ethanol and bio-diesel dominate 
the market. Brazil took steps some thirty years ago to reduce its dependency on oil, by 
building  the  necessary  infrastructure  for  becoming  the  leader  in  the  sugarcane-based 
ethanol  industry.  Following  Brazil’s  example,  the  U.S.  has  decided  to  move  towards 
reducing its oil dependence; essentially this has been done through two mechanisms: (a) 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 requiring doubling the U.S.’s use of alternative fuels by 
fuel blenders to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012, a target that has now been surpassed by the 
“Twenty in Ten” 2007 State of the Union Policy Initiative that requires an increase in the 
supply of alternative fuels, by setting a mandatory fuels standard to assure 35 billion 
gallons of renewable and alternative fuels in 2017 (State of the Union Address 2007)
1; 
and, (b) a government  mandate requiring that ethanol be used instead of methyl-tert-  3 
butyl-ether (MTBE) for blending in reformulated gasoline as the latter has been shown to 
pollute ground water (Dougherty and English 2006). 
Table 1 shows that Brazil and U.S. are the leaders in producing ethanol. Notice 
that Brazil dominated the market in 2004 and 2005 but it is just since 2006 that U.S. has 
begun to capture a slightly greater share of the market producing 36% of the total world 
ethanol production, while Brazil’s share is 33.3%: 
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Fossil fuel production is still more price-competitive than production of biofuels. In order 
to compensate for this gap in price competitiveness, the ethanol industry (as well as the 
other alternative biofuels industries) is heavily subsidized inside and protected from the 
outside  in  the  U.S.
2  To  illustrate  the  significance  of  trade  distortions  imposed  in  the 
ethanol industry, it is worth noting that U.S. imports of ethanol from Brazil face high 
tariffs:  a  2.5  percent  ad  valorem  tax,  and  a  secondary  tariff  of  54  cents-per-gallon,   4 
imposed to offset the 51 cents-per-gallon domestic subsidy to refiners who blend ethanol 
with gasoline (Kopp 2006).
3  
The hypothesis of this study is that trade distortions prevent both the U.S. and Brazil 
reaping the gains from trade due to their comparative advantage
4, thus in our analysis we 
assess the impact of the elimination of those distortions through the estimation of a partial 
equilibrium trade model – an ethanol export supply function for Brazil and an ethanol 
import demand function for the U.S.-, the results of which will allow us to perform a 
“back-of-the-envelope” calculation of the deadweight loss (DWL) that they cause as well 
as  the  one  incurred  by  the  production  of  the  35  billion  gallons  of  ethanol  per  year 
proposed by the “Twenty  in  Ten” policy initiative. Once the model is  estimated, the 
degree  of  responsiveness  of  Brazilian  exports  to  changes  in  the  world  price  and  the 
impact that changes in U.S. import demand have on the world price are analyzed as well. 
The latter will be accomplished by the estimation of the export supply price-elasticity and 
the import demand flexibility, which is then used in the computation of the deadweight 
loss to society in both countries. 
 
RELEVANT FACTS  
Before developing the model it is of interest to show some relevant facts and figures that 
can help put into context the importance of the issues studied in this paper. During the 
last thirty years all of the major oil consumers and producers have been lowering their 
ratio of oil use to gross domestic product (GDP), mainly because of the rise in crude oil 
prices  and  the  unstable  political  situations  threatening  supply  from  abroad  (The   5 
Economist 2006). Thus, many countries have begun to enhance the economic viability of 
alternative energy sources, specifically corn-ethanol in the U.S. and sugarcane ethanol in 
Brazil. In the particular case of ethanol, Brazil is still the world leader even though it 
produced slightly less ethanol than the U.S. in 2006, because the cost of making a gallon 
of ethanol from corn in the U.S. is approximately 30 percent higher than making a gallon 
of ethanol from sugarcane in Brazil (Weintraub 2007). 
Babcock (2007) highlights three main disadvantages of producing ethanol from 
corn: (1) the great amount of energy it takes to grow corn and to produce ethanol; (2) the 
fact that expanded corn production could negatively affect soil and water resources as 
farmers till more acres and use land belonging to the Conservation Reserve Program and 
the  Wetlands  Reserve  Program;  (3)  as  corn  farmers  look  for  increased  yields,  the 
intensification of production could lead to larger nutrient and soil losses.  However, he 
also remarks that there are two primary public benefits from increased production and 
consumption of biofuels: (1) using biofuels instead of fossil fuels can decrease the rate at 
which greenhouse gases build up in the atmosphere (notwithstanding, this gain can be 
undermined because fossil fuels like diesel fuel, pesticides, fertilizer, electricity used to 
pump irrigation water, and propane, are also used to deliver corn to ethanol plants, and 
because the  amount of  energy necessary to run an  ethanol plant  and to dry distillers 
grains); (2) if biofuels and other alternative energy sources comprise a larger share of 
U.S. total energy usage, energy security may increase. Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol, on the 
other hand, reduces greenhouse gas emissions by a much greater amount than corn-based 
ethanol, and Brazilian ethanol imports surely increase energy diversification according to   6 
Babcock. Following this line of reasoning, Weintraub (2007) comments that corn-based 
ethanol burns up about seven times more fossil fuel per unit of energy produced than 
Brazil' s cane-based ethanol, and also it will take a while for any other country to copy 
Brazil, where ethanol already accounts for 40% of the fuel used in cars. 
  Finally, it is important to address here the current debate that has arisen due to the 
increasing price of gasoline. According to The New York Times (May 24 2007), some oil 
executives are now warning that the current shortages of fuel could become a long-term 
problem, and surprisingly, they point to the uncertainty created by the government’s push 
to increase the supply of biofuels like ethanol in coming years. Executives such as John 
D. Hofmeister, the president of the Shell Oil Company, argue that the 2007 State of the 
Union Policy Initiative has forced many oil companies to reconsider or scale back their 
plans  for  constructing  new  refinery  capacity.  This  is  an  example  of  the  very  diverse 
impacts that a policy like this can have, so it should be stressed that any welfare impact 
derived from an analysis of only the ethanol market would be understating the negative 
impact if it does not take into account the deadweight losses that it might be generating in 
other markets (such as the gasoline market just mentioned, but also the beef and the diary 
industries, and so on). Consequently, the “back-of-the-envelope” calculation of the DWL 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The  fundamentals  of  the  analysis  in  the  present  study  come  from  international  trade 
theory and from the econometrics theory, the former is the basis for the setting of the 
equations  used  in  the  latter,  so  both  of  them  complement  each  other  in  building  a 
comprehensive partial equilibrium model of ethanol trade between Brazil and the U.S. In 
order to explain the international trade theory supporting our framework, Figure 1 shows 
a partial-equilibrium diagram of international trade in good x, where the home country h 
(in this case, the United States) imposes a tariff that raises the domestic price to Px and 
reduces the foreign price to Px
*’. In this setting it is assumed that both the home country 
and  the  foreign  country  f  (in  this  case,  Brazil)  are  large  economies,  which  is  in 
accordance with the characteristics of their ethanol markets, as discussed earlier. It can be 
seen in the graph that Ix
h is the import-demand function in the home country h (the U.S.) 
and the line Ex
f is the export-supply function for the foreign country (Brazil). The free 
trade equilibrium is at point A, with imports equal to OIx
h* and price equal to Px
*. When 
country h imposes a tariff, its tariff-distorted import-demand function becomes Ixt
h, so 
trade volume decreases, the domestic price in h rises to Px, and the foreign price falls to 
Px
*’. The higher price in h generates the following welfare effects: deadweight efficiency 
losses of area CBA and tariff revenue of PxPx
*’BD, which consists of a transfer from 
consumers to revenue receipts of PxPx
*’BC and a terms-of trade gain of PxPx
*’CD. So the 
net gain or loss to country h is PxPx
*’CD-CBA (country f gains what h loses, or loses what 
h gains). The global net welfare loss is ABD. 
   8 










Source: Markusen, Melvin, Kaempfer, and K.E. Maskus (1995). 
 
It can be seen that behind the supply and demand functions being estimated stands the 
concept of welfare in both countries and the losses or gains from their mutual trade, this 
study takes advantage of this setting to generate a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation of 
the DWL caused by the ad valorem tax and the tariff imposed on Brazilian imports in the 
U.S. that will help gauge the actual impact of these distortions to society. Also, it should 
be noted that the estimated model includes all the trade distortions in the ethanol market, 
and our main interest will be in determining if the movements in prices and quantities 
shown in the figure will appear when eliminating all trade distortions in the U.S, through 
the study of demand and supply elasticities. 
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On the econometric theory side, the technique that is used to estimate the supply 
and demand functions just described, is Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), which is a 
special case of the instrumental variables technique, and a method that corrects for the 
problem that arises when we face a system of equations such as the one of our interest: all 
the endogenous variables (the price of ethanol in this case) are random variables, so a 
change  in  the  disturbance  term  changes  all  the  endogenous  variables,  since  they  are 
determined simultaneously, thus Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators will be biased, 
even asymptotically (Kennedy 1998). 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
As the ethanol industry has only recently entered the researchers’ agenda, there is not a 
very  rich  literature  on  the  specific  topic  developed  in  this  study;  nevertheless,  an 
exhaustive search led us to conclude that there are five relevant papers. The first, written 
by  Gallagher,  Guenter,  Shapouri  and  Brubaker  (2006),  studies  the  international 
competitiveness of the U.S. corn-ethanol industry versus the Brazil’s sugarcane-ethanol 
industry by estimating an econometric model of the processing cost differences using 
monthly data from January 1973 to June 2002. Gallagher et al. compute a cost advantage 
measure as the sum of the cost of sugar in ethanol production and the cost of ethanol 
transport from Brazil to the U.S. and then subtract both the net cost of corn in ethanol 
production (they distinguish between producing in wet or dry mills, wet mills produce 
ethanol and corn gluten meal, corn gluten feed, corn oil, and carbon dioxide (CO2) as by-
products, while dry mills produce ethanol dried distillers grains with solubles (DDGS)   10 
and CO2 as by products) and the cost of energy in corn ethanol production. Afterwards, 
the  authors  use  time  series  analysis  on  the  cost  advantage  measure  in  order  to 
discriminate  between  random  weather  shocks,  sugar  and  corn  market  cycles,  and 
financial policy changes. They conclude that the U.S. would often be an ethanol importer 
without taking into account the duties of U.S. or Brazil on ethanol imports, but that the 
U.S. could take an occasional or cyclical export position in the ethanol market.  
In contrast, Koizumi (2003) explores the impacts of Brazil’s ethanol production 
on  the  world  ethanol  and  sugar  markets.  He  develops  a  dynamic  partial  equilibrium 
model to analyze how an ethanol, energy or environmental policy in major producing 
countries (14 countries for the world sugar market and 11 for the ethanol markets) will 
affect not only the ethanol market but also the domestic and world sugar markets. The 
article also offers market perspectives to the year 2010 for both sugar and ethanol. Some 
of the main results are: (1) Brazil’s ethanol production is projected to increase by 2.3 
percent per year and its exports are predicted to increase 3.9 percent per year (while sugar 
exports are predicted to decrease), (2) the figures for the U.S. are 5.7 and -3.0 percent per 
year, respectively. Koizumi concludes that the government of Brazil can control not only 
domestic sugar and ethanol markets, but also the world sugar and ethanol price, and the 
only tool for controlling the movements in quantity and price is the anhydrous ethanol 
blend ratio because the rest of the variables are under no market regulation. Therefore, 
Koizumi postulates that Brazil has and will unarguably have a competitive advantage in 
the world ethanol market.   11 
Elobeid  and  Tokgoz  (2006a)  analyze  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  and 
removal of the federal tax credit in the U.S. on U.S. and Brazilian ethanol markets using a 
multi-market international ethanol model calibrated on 2005 market data and policies, 
where the general structure of the country model is made up of behavioral equations for 
production,  consumption,  ending  stocks,  and  net  trade.  Their  model  solves  for  a 
representative world ethanol price (Brazilian anhydrous ethanol price) by equating excess 
supply and excess demand across countries. This study finds that trade barriers in the 
U.S. have been effective in protecting the ethanol industry and keeping domestic prices 
strong, because with the removal of trade distortions, the world ethanol price increases by 
23.9% (this is the first scenario, which implies the removal of the trade barriers: the out-
of-quota duties of 2.5 percent  and the 54 cents per  gallon tariff, for  all U.S. ethanol 
imports; whereas in the second scenario where they remove the trade barriers and the 
federal tax credit for the refiners that blend ethanol with gasoline the increase in the 
world ethanol price is 16.51%). Along with the increase in the world price the demand for 
ethanol increases, and therefore net imports increase in the U.S. by 199.04% (136.97% in 
the second scenario). Thus, Brazil, with its comparative advantage of low-cost ethanol 
production, would benefit from the removal of U.S. duties (Brazilian net exports increase 
63.96% in the first scenario and 44.01% in the second scenario) and depending on the 
prices of ethanol and sugar, Brazil may end up increasing both the production of ethanol 
and sugar by expanding its sugarcane area. This article and the other two that followed its 
publication,  which  I  will  summarize  in  the  following  paragraphs,  develops  the  most   12 
comprehensive analysis found among the limited number of studies on ethanol markets 
and can be used as a baseline for any further study. 
A month after the publication of the paper just reviewed, Elobeid and Tokgoz 
(2006b) published another study that adds to the analysis of the ethanol market by linking 
it  to  the  energy  and  crop  markets,  specifically  corn  and  sugarcane  markets.  The 
explanation  they  give  for  the  importance  of  the  latter  markets  is  also  critical  for 
understanding the reasoning behind the inclusion of the price of corn and the price of 
sugar in the model developed in the present study: (1) the inclusion of the price of a 
feedstock such as corn is relevant because it constitutes the major cost for an ethanol 
plant, thus the cost of the feedstock is an important determinant of the profit margin for 
ethanol plants and determines the expansion of plant capacity; (2) including the price of 
sugarcane is mandatory given that ethanol in Brazil is produced primarily from sugarcane 
and a large number of the existing plants in Brazil are dual plants (they produce both 
commodities at a maximum ratio of 55 to 45), moreover, depending on the relative prices, 
these plants can switch between the production of sugar and ethanol. 
Besides  analyzing  the  scenarios  in  which  shocks  to  corn  and  sugar  prices  are 
introduced exogenously to the baseline (the shocks are given at 20% for each commodity 
starting in 2006 and covering the period to 2015), Elobeid and Tokgoz (2006b) are also 
interested  in  gasoline  price  shocks.  Their  main  motivation  is  the  strong  historical 
relationship between ethanol and gasoline prices in the U.S., whereas in the case of Brazil 
the link between ethanol and gasoline was weak but the increase in global interest in   13 
ethanol as a fuel alternative as well as the introduction of flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) in 
2003 has changed this relationship. 
The authors set a non-spatial, multi-market world model linking ethanol to its 
input and output markets, and they solve for a representative world ethanol price (the 
Brazilian anhydrous ethanol price) by equating excess supply and excess demand across 
countries. Their model includes the following major policy parameters: the 51 cents per 
gallon volumetric ethanol excise tax credit that refiners receive for blending 10% ethanol 
with  gasoline;  the  mandated  requirement  of  ethanol  blend  in  certain  states;  and  the 
Renewable  Fuels  Standard  (RFS)  of  the  Energy  Bill  of  2005  (notice  that  the  target 
implied by this has been surpassed by the “Twenty in 10” policy initiative discussed at 
the beginning of this paper). They show that an increase in gasoline prices affects the 
U.S.  and  Brazilian  ethanol  markets  differently  because  of  the  characteristics  of  their 
respective vehicle fleets. This proves the importance of the composition of the vehicle 
fleet on the relative magnitudes of the complementarity and substitution relationships 
between ethanol and gasoline, because in the short run, with the limited number of FFVs 
in  the  U.S.,  the  world  ethanol  price  declines  by  about  1.9%  because  of  lower  U.S. 
demand, since net U.S. imports decline by 16.7%, thus Brazilian net exports decline by 
5.3% as U.S. ethanol demand falls. Nevertheless, once the model allows that in the long 
run the number of FFVs in the U.S. increases, then U.S. net imports increase by 278.2%, 
thus the world ethanol price increases by 34.9%.  
On the other hand, an increase in the U.S. corn price decreases the profit margin 
for ethanol plants and leads to a reduction in ethanol production, as a result, the U.S.   14 
domestic ethanol price increases, making ethanol imports from Brazil relatively more 
attractive (thus U.S. net imports increase by 56.5%, the world ethanol price does so by 
6.6% and Brazilian net exports increase by 17.4%). Finally, the scenario in which there is 
a  shock  that  increases  the  world  price  of  raw  sugar  diverts  more  sugarcane  into  the 
production of sugar relative to ethanol in Brazil. Consequently, Brazilian production is 
lower and its net exports decline by nearly 10%, this leads to an increase in the world 
ethanol price by 6.1% and a decline in U.S. net imports of 24.9%. The results of the 
scenarios show that ethanol and sugar prices tend to move together in Brazil. 
  Finally,  Elobeid  et  al.  (2007)  make  projections  using  a  multi-product,  multi-
country deterministic partial equilibrium model updating U.S. ethanol production figures 
as well as its impacts on planted acreage, crop prices, livestock production and prices, 
and trade that were released by Elobeid and Tokgoz (2006a), but now they incorporate a 
number of more realistic assumptions. Following the lines of the latter study, they use the 
concept of a long-run equilibrium as an aid to understanding the eventual impact of the 
biofuels sector on agriculture (if the ethanol industry is in equilibrium, then there is no 
incentive to build new ethanol plants and there is no incentive to shut down existing 
plants). One of the assumptions they make to analyze their different scenarios are that 
cellulosic ethanol is not competitive under current policy incentives. The authors evaluate 
three scenarios: (1) higher oil prices combined with widespread adoption of flexible fuel 
vehicles, (2) removal of an additional seven million acres from the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), (3) a repeat of the drought of 1988 combined with a 14.7 billion gallon 
ethanol mandate. They arrive at various important results but, particularly, the ones that   15 
concern the purpose of this paper are: (a) if oil prices are permanently 10 dollars per 
barrel  higher  than  assumed  in  the  baseline  projections,  U.S.  ethanol  will  expand 
significantly, the magnitude of the expansion will depend on the future makeup of the 
U.S. automobile fleet; (b) if sufficient demand for E-85 from FFVs is available, corn-
based ethanol production is projected to ramp up to over 30 billion gallons per year with 
higher oil prices; (c) U.S. corn acreage would increase to more than 110 million acres, 
largely at the expense of soybean and wheat acres; (d) equilibrium corn prices would rise 
to more than $4.40 per bushel if another 1988-type drought in 2012 occurs combined 
with a large mandate for continued ethanol production; (e) ethanol demand becomes the 
limiting factor to the growth of the ethanol sector, because as production increases, the 
price of ethanol has to fall relative to its energy value to encourage gas stations and car 





In order to estimate the partial equilibrium model, annual data were gathered from 1975 
to 2006 for both Brazil and U.S., in the case of the variables for which only monthly or 
daily  data  were  available  their  annual  average  was  computed.  The  following  table 
describes the source of the variables employed in estimating the model. It is important to 
highlight that in the case of the price of ethanol, ideally the Brazilian anhydrous ethanol 
price should be used as the world price (according to Elobeid and Tokgoz 2006a, 2006b),   16 
but it was not possible to get historical annual data for the whole period of interest so the 
U.S.  ethanol  price  was  used  instead  (for  1975-1981  ethanol  prices  were  assumed  to 
behave like gasoline prices given that historically the relationship between ethanol and 
gasoline prices in the U.S. has been strong (Elobeid and Tokgoz 2006b)). All real figures 
are on a 2000 basis. 
 
Table 2. Sources of the Variables Employed to Estimate the Model
5 
Variable 
[notation in model] 
Sources 
[Units] 
Price of ethanol 
[Peth,t] 
Nebraska Ethanol Board, Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
[real dollars per gallon] 
Net Brazilian exports 
[Et] 
Uniao da Industria de Cana de Açúcar (ÚNICA), Elobeid and Tokgoz 
(2006b) 
[million gallons] 
Net U.S. imports 
[It] 
Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) 
[million gallons] 
Price of sugar 
[Psug,t] 
Economic Research Service-U.S. Department of Agriculture (ERS-USDA) 
[dollars per pound] 
Price of oil 
[Poil,t] 
U.S. Department of Energy (US-DOE), Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
[dollars per barrel] 
Price of corn 
[Pcorn,t] 
ERS-USDA 
[dollars per bushel] 
Price of gasoline 
[Pgas,t] 
EIA 
[dollars per gallon] 
Population and real gross 
domestic product (RGDP) 
[RGDPPCBr,t, RGDPPCUS,t] 
ERS-USDA 
[million people, real billion dollars] 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  ERS-USDA 
Exchange rate 
Escola Superior de Agricultura “Luiz de Queiroz”- Centro de Estudos 
Avançados em Economia Aplicada (ESALQ-CEPEA) 
[dollars per real]   17 
The following two tables show the descriptive statistics of the variables employed. Table 
3 shows their levels and Table 4 shows their natural logarithms. 
 



















U.S. real GDP 
per capita
 Mean 1.93 243.79 47.69 0.17 33.88 3.51 1.68 3,156.09 28,598.13
 Median 1.66 102.52 19.98 0.13 26.60 2.93 1.50 3,175.70 28,359.63
 Maximum 3.44 898.19 653.30 0.66 78.20 8.63 2.61 3,689.98 38,680.73
 Minimum 1.01 56.01 3.11 0.06 12.97 1.73 1.12 2,601.85 20,069.26
 Std. Dev. 0.69 226.63 115.77 0.14 16.15 1.77 0.41 270.34 5,325.78
 Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32  
 





















 Mean 0.60 5.11 2.92 -1.97 3.42 1.15 0.49 8.05 10.24
 Median 0.51 4.63 2.99 -2.03 3.28 1.07 0.41 8.06 10.25
 Maximum 1.24 6.80 6.48 -0.42 4.36 2.16 0.96 8.21 10.56
 Minimum 0.01 4.03 1.13 -2.74 2.56 0.55 0.11 7.86 9.91
 Std. Dev. 0.35 0.87 1.23 0.58 0.44 0.45 0.23 0.09 0.19
 Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32  
 
Econometric model 
As discussed earlier, the method followed in estimating the export supply and 
import demand functions is 2SLS. Given that Table 2 enumerates the notation assigned to 
each variable, it will not be described again in this section, but it should be added that t 
represents a trend variable. The following model was estimated: 
 
t t Br t oil t sug t eth t t RGDPPC P P P E e a a a a a a + + + + + + = 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 ln ln ln ln ln ) 1 (  
t t US t gas t corn t eth t t eth t RGDPPC P P P I P u b b b b b b b + + + + + + + = - 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 0 , ln ln ln ln ln ln ) 2 (
   18 
Using  the  TSLS  option  of  EViews  for  obtaining  the  estimation  of  the  first  equation, 
which is the one that needs to be instrumentalized, and correcting each of the equations 
either for heteroskedasticity or for serial correlation if necessary
6, the following results 
were obtained:  
 
Table 5. Estimation of the Export Supply Function (Brazil) 
Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of net Brazilian exports 
Variable  Coefficient  P-value 
constant  -1.2713 
 
0.8506 
ln price of ethanol  0.2376 
 
0.3682 
ln price of sugar  -0.0048 
 
0.9571 
ln price of oil  -0.1349 
 
0.3899 
ln Brazil’s RGDPPC   0.5908 
 
0.4917 
trend  0.1128 
 
0.0008 






Prob (F)  0.0000 
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Table 6. Estimation of the Import Demand Function (U.S.) 
Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of the price of ethanol 
Variable  Coefficient  P-value 
constant  4.1043 
 
0.3787 
ln net U.S. imports  0.0874 
 
0.0151 




ln price of corn  0.0028 
 
0.9698 
ln price of gasoline  0.9760 
 
0.0000 
ln U.S. RGDPPC   -0.3833 
 
0.4104 




Prob (F)  0.0000 
Durbin-Watson  2.3653 
 
Notice that the R
2 and the adjusted R
2 were not reported in the tables - this is because a 
feature  of  TSLS  models  is  that  these  statistics  and  all  related  measures  are  biased. 
Another drawback of TSLS models is that they tend to exhibit high multicollinearity 
between the explanatory variables, so it is not surprising to see that some of the variables 
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Interpretation of the results 
Export supply function of Brazil: From Table 5 it can be observed that the signs of the 
coefficients were as expected: (i) there is a positive relation between exports and the 
world price, this is in accordance with the basic trade model used in the analysis; (ii) the 
negative effect on  exports of the price of sugar arises because there is a substitution 
between sugar and ethanol production at the firms’ plants, such that if there is a higher 
price of sugar there is a shift to this product and a reduction in the production of ethanol 
available for export; and, (iii) the negative effect of a rise in the oil prices on the export 
supply is due to a substitution effect in Brazil between oil and ethanol, i.e., the domestic 
demand for ethanol rises if the price of oil increases such that available production for 
exports is reduced in order to satisfy domestic needs, also this effect may be due to some 
kind of “green” effect that comes into play once oil becomes expensive. The real GDP 
per capita is included only for the purpose of controlling for macroeconomic effects on 
net Brazilian exports (the same reasoning applies for the estimation of the U.S. import 
demand function) therefore its sign and impact is not relevant for the purpose of this 
study, this also applies for the trend included in the regressions (which helps to prevent 
the possibility the coefficients capture spurious relationships between the variables). 
The result that is critical in this equation, due to it being an important variable for 
the  “back-of-the-envelope”  calculation  of  DWL,  is  the  price  elasticity  of  the  export 
supply, which was found to be 0.24% (this number implies that an increase in 1% in the 
price of ethanol would increase Brazilian net exports by 0.24%). 
   21 
Import demand function of the U.S.: In the case of the results shown in Table 6, the signs 
of the coefficients are also as expected: (i) there is a positive relation between imports 
and the world price of ethanol, which again is in accordance with the trade model; (ii) the 
positive effect on the price of ethanol when the price of corn goes up is due to the fact 
that, when the corn price increases, the profit margin for ethanol plants decreases leading 
to a reduction in ethanol production and to an increase in the U.S. domestic ethanol price, 
which makes ethanol imports from Brazil relatively more attractive (net imports increase 
so the world price of ethanol ramps up) as described by Elobeid and Tokgoz (2006b); (iii) 
a positive effect on the price of ethanol when the price of gasoline rises agrees with the 
fact  that  historically  these  prices  have  moved  in  the  same  direction  in  the  U.S. 
(nevertheless, recall that Elobeid and Tokgoz (2006b) found that this impact might be 
different depending on the composition of the vehicle fleets through time).  
The specification of the import demand equation will not allow for computing the 
elasticity but it can easily give us a measure of flexibility (the inverse of the elasticity). 
From  Table  6,  it  can  be  observed  that  the  flexibility  is  0.09%,  which  means  that  an 
increase in imports of ethanol from Brazil by 1% will increase the world price by 0.09%. 
The inclusion of the lag of the price of ethanol is designed to capture the effect of the 
impacts of changes in price in the immediate last period, it can also help compute the 
long run flexibilities. Nevertheless, in this case, the short and long-run flexibilities are 
very similar, 0.0874 versus 0.0877, respectively, so it does not make a big difference to 
employ one or another, thus the short run flexibility will be used in the calculation of the 
DWL.   22 
Calculation of the DWL of trade distortions 
As mentioned before, the results derived from the partial equilibrium model will be used 
to arrive at a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation of the DWL caused by the existing trade 
distortions (we will focus on the 2.5% ad valorem tax and the 54 cents per gallon tariff) 
in  the  ethanol  trade  between  Brazil  and  U.S.  They  will  also  be  useful  in  a  similar 
calculation for the impact of producing the 35 billion gallons per year in 2017 proposed 
by the “Twenty in Ten” policy initiative holding the following assumptions: (1) there is 
no  intention  to  eliminate  trade  distortions;  (2)  the  elasticities  of  demand  and  supply 
remain  constant  throughout  the  ten-year  period;  (3)  the  ratio  of  imports  to  total 
production of ethanol in the U.S. remains constant at its 2006 level (13.46%). 











) 3 (  
where: 
t = tax 
P
* = pretax market price (the price of ethanol in this case) 
Q
* = pretax quantity (the equilibrium volume of ethanol traded in the market) 
Es = price elasticity of supply 
Ed = price elasticity of demand (this will be the inverse of the flexibility found when 
estimating the import demand function) 
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The quantities and prices that were used in the model include the trade distortions, thus 
the first step was to obtain the corresponding ones without the trade distortions (every 
calculation will be done on the average value of each variable to get a representative 
measure of magnitudes). Given some assumptions, the following results were obtained: 
 
 
Table 7. DWL from Current Conditions of the Market 
Concept  Value 
P  1.93 
Q  145.74 
P
*  1.35 
Q
*  361.19 
Es  0.24 
Ed  11.45 
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Table 8. DWL from the “Twenty in Ten” Policy Initiative  
Concept  Value 
P  7.20 
Q  4709.71 
P
*  7.92 
Q
*  4718.56 
Es  0.24 
Ed  11.45 
DWL  1,324.75 
 
Table  7  shows  that  under  the  current  trade  distortions,  the  DWL  to  society  in  both 
countries is $17.3 million (2000 dollars). Including the “Twenty in Ten” Policy Initiative, 
the  DWL  rises  to  $1,324.75  million  in  2017.  These  magnitudes  illustrate  that  the 




This paper contributes to the discussion of whether or not the U.S. should reduce tariffs 
and taxes imposed on the imports of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol by estimating a partial 
equilibrium model – an export supply function and an import demand function- using 
2SLS.   25 
From the estimation of the export supply function of Brazil, a positive relation 
between the exports and the world price was found implying a price elasticity of 0.24%, 
which is in accordance with the basic trade model used in this study. On the other hand, 
the estimation of the import demand function derived a flexibility of 0.09%, which is 
again in accordance with the trade model and implies a positive relation between imports 
and the world price of ethanol. 
Among the other relevant results from the estimation of the model are: (a) there is a 
negative effect on exports if the price of sugar increases because there is a substitution 
between sugar and ethanol production at the firms’ plants; (b) there is a negative effect of 
a rise in the oil prices on the export supply due to a substitution effect in Brazil between 
oil and ethanol; (c) there is a positive effect on the price of ethanol when the price of corn 
goes up because this leads to a reduction in ethanol production and to an increase in the 
U.S. domestic ethanol price, which increases its net imports and rises the world price of 
ethanol; (d) there is a positive effect on the price of ethanol when the price of gasoline 
rises which agrees with the fact that historically these prices have moved in the same 
direction in the U.S. 
Finally,  a  “back-of-the-envelope”  calculation  shows  that  under  the  current  trade 
distortions, the DWL to society in both countries is $17.3 million in real terms (2000 
dollars). Including the “Twenty in Ten” Policy Initiative, the DWL rises to $1,324.75 
million in 2017. These magnitudes illustrate that the accumulated negative impact on 
welfare  of  trade  distortions  over  time  can  reach  very  high  levels,  signaling  that  the 
elimination of trade distortions or at least the reduction of the tariffs imposed by the U.S.   26 
on ethanol imports from Brazil would benefit the society as Brazil would be exploiting its 
comparative advantage in producing ethanol (even though U.S. produced slightly more 
ethanol than Brazil in 2006, Brazil is still the least-cost producer of the market). 
There are some other issues that must be taken into account when further analyzing 
the ethanol market. First, the necessary political arrangements for the removal of the US 
tariff imposed on ethanol imported from Brazil will be difficult to implement and costly 
to reach because there are vested interests in the industries affected. Second, there is a 
great deal of  research in the U.S. for  alternative energy sources besides ethanol, this 
includes either developments in the bio-diesel industry or other substitute inputs (switch-
grass, sugar beets, peach pits, etc). And, third, an analysis of Brazilian social and land 
costs is also critical in determining the possible impacts of a policy causing an increase in 
the demand for sugarcane ethanol in Brazil; there are potential environmental, health and 
labor costs to the Brazilian population involved in this decision such that by only taking 
into account the direct market impacts we do not get a full picture of the problem.   27 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1 The “Twenty in Ten” initiative has the goal of reducing U.S. projected annual gasoline 
usage by 20 percent. The target mentioned in this paper is planning to displace 15 percent 
of that projected gasoline use. Meanwhile, the other 5 percent reduction will be obtained 
by reforming and modernizing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for 
cars  and  extending  the  current  light  truck  rule.  President  Bush’s  proposal  will  also 
increase the scope of the current Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), expanding it to an 
Alternative  Fuel  Standard  (AFS),  which  will  include  sources  such  as  corn  ethanol, 
cellulosic ethanol, biodiesel, methanol, butanol, hydrogen, and alternative fuels. It is also 
important to highlight that, for the sake of energy security, President Bush expects most 
of the expanded fuel standard to be met with domestically-produced alternative fuels; 
nevertheless, he is not discarding importing alternative fuels because he considers that it 
will also increase the diversity of fuel sources. 
2 Brazil also provided high subsidies to ethanol producers in the early years of its ethanol 
development  but  thanks  to  the  advancement  of  technology  the  direct  subsidies  were 
terminated, nonetheless there are still indirect subsidies for the infrastructure in terms of 
transportation and distribution of ethanol. It is expected that U.S. will need to provide the 
same  kind  of  support  for  the  development  of  infrastructure  as  ethanol  use  increases 
(Weintraub 2007). 
3 It should be noted that Brazil grants government credit to the sugar industry to cover 
60% of its storage costs in order to guarantee ethanol supplies, it has also mandated their   28 
                                                                                                                                                   
use  in  government  fleet  vehicles  (Biofuels  Taskforce  of  the  Australian  Government 
2005), thus, Brazil is not free of domestic trade distortions but the interest of this study is 
focused on the U.S. ethanol industry. 
4  According  to  the  Renewable  Fuels  Association  (RFA),  119  ethanol  refineries  are 
currently operating in the U.S. (data as of May 2007), with an additional 86 plants either 
under construction or on expansion. However, U.S. production of ethanol from corn is 
limited by the availability of agricultural land suited to corn production and competing 
food demand for corn (Kopp 2006). The trade-off between those alternative uses of land 
leads us to really reconsider if the U.S. should continue imposing high tariffs on the 
imports of ethanol from Brazil. Babcock (2007) develops an outstanding analysis of the 
impact of production of ethanol on corn and states that corn use by ethanol plants is 
projected to increase by 1.7 billion bushels in 2007 and by at least another 900 million 
bushels in 2008. He also argues that corn acreage will have to increase in 2008 by at least 
three million acres above 2007 intended levels just to keep up with demand, so the only 
way that this level of corn production can be sustained is with high corn prices. 
5 Raw data used in this paper are available on request and further information can be 
obtained in the following website: http://aede.osu.edu/programs/Anderson/trade/. 
6 Further details about the procedure followed to arrive at the final specification of the 
model are available upon request from the authors.   29 
REFERENCES 
Babcock, Bruce A. 2007. “High Crop Prices, Ethanol Mandates, and the Public Good: Do 
They  Coexist?.”  Iowa  Ag  Review  Online,  Spring,  Vol.  13  No.2.  Available  at: 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/iowa_ag_review/spring_07/article1.aspx. 
 
Dougherty,  S.  and  E.  English.  2006.  “The  Energy  Debate:  Is  Ethanol  the  Answer?.” 
ECON SOUTH Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Third Quarter, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 4-
9. 
 
Elobeid,  A.,  and  S.  Tokgoz.  2006a.  “Removal  of  U.S.  ethanol  domestic  and  trade 
distortions: impact on U.S. and Brazilian ethanol markets.” Working paper 06-WP 
427, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, October. 
 
 ___. 2006b. “An Analysis of the Link between Ethanol, Energy, and Crop Markets.” 
Working paper 06-WP 435, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa 
State University, November. 
 
_, J. Fabiosa, D. J. Hayes, B. A. Babcock, T. Yu, F. Dong, C. E. Hart, and J. C. Beghin. 
2007. “Emerging Biofuels: Outlook of Effects on U.S. Grain, Oilseed, and Livestock 
Markets.” Staff Report 07-SR 101, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, 
Iowa State University, May. 
 
The Economist: Available at www.economist.com. 
 
Gallagher,  P.,  S.  Guenter,  H.  Shapouri,  and  H.  Brubaker.  2006.  “The  International 
Competitiveness  of  the  U.S.  Corn-Ethanol  Industry:  A  Comparison  with  Sugar-
Ethanol Processing in Brazil.” Agribusiness 22(1):109-134. 
 
Glyde, P., Australian Government. 2005. Report of the biofuels taskforce to the Prime 
Minister, Biofuels Taskforce, pp. 55-68. 
 
Kennedy, P. 1998. A Guide to Econometrics. 4
th edition, Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 
pp. 157-174 
 
Koizumi, T. 2003. “The Brazilian Ethanol Programme: Impacts on World Ethanol and 
Sugar Markets.” Working paper, Food and Agriculture Organization, Commodity and 
Trade Policy Research No.1, pp.1-21. 
 
Kopp, R. J. 2006. “Replacing oil alternative fuels and technologies.” Resources for the 
Future,  pp.  15-18.  Available  at:  http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-Resources-
163_ReplacingOil.pdf. 
   30 
Markusen,  J.R.,  J.R.  Melvin,  W.H.  Kaempfer,  and  K.E.  Maskus.  1995.  International 
Trade: Theory and Evidence, McGraw-Hill, pp. 281-285. 
 
The New York Times: Available at http://www.nytimes.com 
 
Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) Industry Statistics: Available at: 
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/. 
 
Salvatore,  D.  2002.  Schaum' s  Outlines  Statistics  and  Econometrics  (2nd  Edition). 
Blacklick, OH, USA: McGraw-Hill Professional, p. 230. 
 
Shapouri, H., and M. Salassi. 2006. "The economic feasibility of ethanol production from 
sugar in the United States.", Washington DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, July, 
p.27. 
 
State of the Union Address 2007: Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/. 
 
Weintraub, S. 2007. “Promising Ethanol Developments.” Issues in International Political 
Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., 
March, No. 87, pp. 1-2. 
 